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MOTHERS VERSUS BABIES: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLICY PROBLEMS WITH PROSECUTIONS FOR PRENATAL
MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
ABSTRACT
This note examines the constitutional and policy implications
of criminal prosecutions for prenatal maternal substance abuse
under statutes criminalizing drug delivery, child abuse, and man-
slaughter. Although only one of these convictions has been upheld
in the thirty years since a prosecutor first brought such charges,
prosecutors continue to propose new and increasingly inventive
theories of prosecution. Not only do these cases present procedural
due process, substantive due process, and equal protection problems,
they also cannot be supported by public policy. The prosecutions are
opposed by healthcare workers, pit the interests of mothers and un-
born children against each other, and actually drive pregnant addicts
away from prenatal care. Although a number of punitive solutions
have been proposed, including statutes written specifically to target
prenatal drug use and civil sanctions, the only real solution to the
problem of prenatal maternal drug use is to increase funding for drug
treatment centers that cater to or can accommodate pregnant women.
INTRODUCTION
I. THEORIES OF PROSECUTION
A. Prosecutions Under Delivery of Drugs Statutes
B. Prosecutions Under Child Abuse Statutes
C. Prosecutions Under Manslaughter Statutes
D. Consideration of Prenatal Drug Use in Termination of
Parental Rights
II. PROBLEMS WITH CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Constitutional Implications
1. Procedural Due Process and Vagueness
2. Substantive Due Process and Privacy
3. Equal Protection
B. Public Policy Implications
1. Health Care Response to Prosecutions
2. Maternal Interests Versus Fetal Interests
3. Prosecutions Do Not Satisfy the Intended Goal
635
636 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:635
III. ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION UNDER ABUSE OR DELIVERY
STATUTES
A. Statutes Tailored to Prenatal Drug Use
B. Civil Sanctions
C. Increased Funding for Voluntary Treatment
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 2004, Regina Kilmon gave birth to a 5.5 pound baby
boy, Andrew, at Easton Memorial Hospital in Easton, Maryland.1
Despite having completed numerous drug treatment programs,
Regina continued to use cocaine during her pregnancy.2 Andrew
tested positive for cocaine one day after his birth.3 As a result of this
positive test result, in August of that year, Regina was prosecuted for
"second degree child abuse, contributing to conditions that render
a child delinquent, reckless endangerment, and possession of a
controlled dangerous substance."4 Regina pled guilty to the charge
of reckless endangerment and was sentenced to four years in prison.5
Although Regina's conviction was ultimately overturned,6 her
prosecution marks a thirty-year trend of criminal prosecutions for
maternal prenatal drug use.' Prosecutors variously rely upon three
distinct theories: use of (1) statutes criminalizing delivery or distri-
bution of drugs to the child either in utero or via the umbilical cord
in the period between birth of the child and severance of the umbilical
1. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 307 (Md. 2006).
2. See id.; Greg Maki, Woman Sentenced for Reckless Endangerment: Her Newborn
Tested Positive for Cocaine, STAR-DEMOCRAT (Easton, Md.), Mar. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.stardem.com/printarticle.asp?article=3399.
3. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 307.
4. Id. The reckless endangerment charge read that 'Ms. Kilmon, 'on or about the 3rd
day of June through the 4th day of June, 2004, in Talbot County, Maryland, did recklessly
engage in conduct, to wit: using cocaine while pregnant with Andrew Kilmon that created
a substantial risk of death and serious physical harm to Andrew Kilmon."' Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 315.
7. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Substance
Abuse Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of Controlled Substance to Child, 70
A.L.R.5th 461, 476 (1999).
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cord;8 (2) child abuse statutes;9 and (3) manslaughter statutes.10
Although generally unsuccessful, these prosecutions represent a dis-
turbing trend toward a legal and societal view of pregnant women as
being little more than incubators for unborn children.1 Continued
8. E.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (overturning the conviction
of Jennifer Clarice Johnson for delivery of a controlled substance where the controlled sub-
stance was ingested prior to labor and the delivery occurred "during the thirty to ninety
seconds following the infant's birth, but before the umbilical cord is severed."); State v.
Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding the dismissal of charges of delivery
and distribution of cocaine to unborn child against Darla Michelle Luster).
9. E.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733,734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing
Teresa Lopez Reinesto's indictment for child abuse after she used heroin while pregnant
and subsequently gave birth to a baby addicted to heroin); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912, 912-13, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that Margaret Velasquez Reyes
could not be charged with felony child endangerment as a result of her addiction to
heroin while pregnant that harmed her unborn twin sons); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d
1140, 1140-41, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the dismissal of aggravated
child abuse charges against Cassandra Gethers where the charges were based on her use
of cocaine during pregnancy and the newborn baby's subsequent dependency on the drug);
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 280-81 (Ky. 1993) (upholding appellate decision
that vacated the conviction of Connie Welch based upon charges of criminal abuse for the
birth of her full-term and otherwise healthy baby who was born addicted to oxycodone);
People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 51-52, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (finding not only that
there was insufficient evidence to charge Kimberly Hardy with child abuse and delivery
of cocaine based upon the infliction of serious harm upon her child, but also that the trans-
fer of cocaine through the umbilical cord after birth and before severing the cord did not
constitute delivery of cocaine under the relevant statute); Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev.
v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 597 (Nev. 1994) (finding that Cathy Encoe could not be charged
with child endangerment for her use of drugs while pregnant where the drugs were trans-
ferred to the baby via the umbilical cord during the brief period after birth and before the
cutting of the cord); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844, 847 (Geneva City Ct. 1992)
(granting Melissa Morabito's motion to dismiss charges of endangering the welfare of a
child where Ms. Morabito smoked cocaine while pregnant, causing the premature birth
of her child, who then tested positive for cocaine); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711, 713
(Ohio 1992) (finding that Tammy Gray could not be charged with child endangerment
based on her substance abuse occurring before the birth of her child where the child was
subsequently born alive); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 895-96, 898 (Tex. App. 1994)
(overturning the conviction of Debra Ann Collins on charges of reckless injury to a child
where she smoked crack while pregnant, resulting in injury to her child who was born
addicted and then suffered from withdrawal); State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 953 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996) (affirming the trial court's decision that Selena Dunn could not be charged with
"second degree criminal mistreatment of her viable unborn child" because her newborn
tested positive for cocaine).
10. E.g., State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-12, 1225 (Haw. 2005) (reversing the trial
court's denial of Tayshea Aiwohi's motion to dismiss charges of manslaughter after she
smoked crystal methamphetamine on the three days preceding, as well as the day of, her
son's birth, which resulted in her son's death from the toxic effects of the drug just two
days after his birth).
11. Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Comment, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal
Status for Prenatal Drug Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1256-58, 1263,
1278, 1290 (1998) (discussing how prosecutions for prenatal drug use violate the consti-
tutional right to privacy, and advocating a "facilitative model" balancing maternal and
fetal interests by providing greater prenatal care and substance abuse treatment); see
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attempts to prosecute women for this behavior suggest the necessity
of some kind of action to address prenatal substance abuse and reduce
unnecessary prosecutions that are almost invariably unsuccessful.
This note argues that criminal prosecutions of this kind present a
number of constitutional and policy problems without protecting un-
born children; these prosecutions may in fact subject unborn children
to increased harm.
Although this note argues that cases overturning convictions for
prenatal substance abuse are correctly decided, in effect arguing for
the status quo, the true problem is that prosecutors continue to bring
such charges. Even the threat of prosecution will drive women away
from necessary resources and work to the detriment of mother and
child alike. And while these convictions are generally reversed, 2 the
time these women spend in jail awaiting appeal is itself a deterrent
to seeking prenatal care. A better alternative is to increase funding
for voluntary drug treatment, particularly programs that are equipped
to assist pregnant women who are addicted to drugs. A number of
commentators supporting this approach have noted that it promotes
a view of mothers and fetuses as having united interests, rather than
an adversarial relationship.1
3
This note will first explore the various ways in which prosecutors
bring these cases: under statutes prohibiting drug delivery, child
abuse, and manslaughter, and in proceedings terminating parental
rights. Part II first examines the constitutional implications of these
prosecutions, focusing on due process, vagueness, privacy, and equal
protection problems. Next this note considers the public policy impli-
cations of these prosecutions by examining the health care response,
the ways in which these prosecutions pit the pregnant woman against
her unborn child, and the ultimate failure of these prosecutions to
achieve their stated goals. Finally, Part III of this note discusses and
also Kay Johnson et al., Recommendations to Improve Preconception Health and Health
Care - United States, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Ctr. For Disease Control &
Prevention), Apr. 21, 2006, at 1, 2, 7, 9, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/PDF/rr/
rr5506.pdf (discussing healthy lifestyle changes in women as "preconception health care"
measures necessary for all women aged 15 to 44 regardless of whether they intend to
procreate).
12. See cases cited supra notes 8-10.
13. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without
Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 571-72,573-76 (1992) (discussing the
problems with the "adversarial model" of dealing with prenatal drug use and promoting
use of a "facilitative approach" including prenatal medical care and drug treatment); Note,
Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of 'Fetal
Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1009-12 (1988) (discussing prenatal drug abuse prose-
cutions as problematic due to constitutional problems as well as the deterrent effect they
serve for women who might otherwise seek prenatal care, while also advocating an
"educative/funding approach" as an alternative).
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evaluates various alternatives to criminal prosecution under these
inapplicable statutes.
I. THEORIES OF PROSECUTION
A. Prosecutions Under Delivery of Drugs Statutes
Prosecutors' most inventive means of attempting to hold pregnant
drug users accountable are prosecutions under statutes proscribing
the delivery of controlled dangerous substances.14 Although these
prosecutions are generally not successful,"5 the explanations for how
such delivery occurs include (1) that a pregnant woman will pass
drug metabolites to the fetus in utero6 and (2) that the mother will
deliver drug metabolites to the newly born child after it has passed
through the birth canal but before its umbilical cord has been cut. 7
The first theory assumes that delivery to a fetus has the same
meaning as delivery to a person, manifestly a problematic assumption
unless the legislature has sought to abrogate the common law mean-
ing of "person" by including a fetus in the delivery statute." In such
prosecutions, the statute simply will not apply. Under the second
theory, where the legislative history fails to specifically reflect an
intent to interpret "delivery" as meaning unplanned and unintended
transmission of drugs to the fetus through an umbilical cord, such
prosecutions also cannot be permitted. s Despite the fact that the preg-
nant drug user's behavior parallels that of a drug user-possessor
rather than a drug dealer who would ordinarily be the target of drug
delivery statutes, "prosecutions have relied upon criminal statutes
for drug delivery and distribution which impose harsher penalties
upon these women than would otherwise be imposed for drug pos-
session."20 Both formulations misread the intended purpose of the
drafting legislatures.
B. Prosecutions Under Child Abuse Statutes
Despite initially seeming straightforward and self-explanatory,
prosecutions for prenatal drug use under child abuse statutes are
14. See Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1270.
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d
32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
16. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33.
17. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290.
18. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34.
19. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290.
20. Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1259.
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based on varying arguments. Despite legislative language to the con-
trary, some prosecutors attempt to argue that a fetus is a child; there-
fore, this argument proceeds, child abuse statutes apply to fetuses
as surely as they do to newborns or older children.2' In the alterna-
tive, prosecutors argue that the injury occurs after birth, when the
baby is born addicted to drugs; at this point, the baby is protected by
the child abuse statute for any harm inflicted, even harm occurring
before birth.22
Although these prosecutions likewise generally fail, it was under
a child abuse theory that Cornelia Whitner was sentenced to eight
years in prison in South Carolina.2" Her conviction still stands.24 The
South Carolina Supreme Court found that the meaning of "child"
encompassed a fetus for the purpose of child abuse statutes, stating
that "it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person
for purposes of homicide laws ... but not for purposes of statutes
proscribing child abuse."25
South Carolina is the exception.2" Arguments that a fetus is a
child for the purposes of child abuse statutes are generally struck
down by the courts.2 In Reyes v. Superior Court, the California court
found that a fetus is not a person for the purposes of the murder
statute or the manslaughter statute, the failure to provide child sup-
port statute, Fourteenth Amendment analysis, or the Social Security
Act.' The court further indicated that if the child abuse statute "were
interpreted as being applicable to endangering a fetus, the rather
absurd result would be that endangering a fetus was more severely
punished than aborting it."29 The court in State v. Dunn likewise
found that "[n]o Washington criminal case has ever included 'unborn
child' or fetus in its definition of person.""° Further, the court con-
cluded that the legislature specifically includes fetuses within the
21. See Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); State v.
Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
22. Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W.2d 280, 280 (Ky. 1993); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (Geneva City Ct.
1992); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (Ohio 1992).
23. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-79 (S.C. 1997) (affirming the conviction of
Cornelia Whitner for child abuse and endangerment after she used cocaine while preg-
nant because the word "child" as used in the statute includes viable fetuses), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1145 (1998).
24. Id. at 779.
25. Id. at 780.
26. Id.
27. E.g., Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.
28. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
29. Id. at 914.
30. State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
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ambit of a statute when it intends to do so, making it inappropriate
for the court to read that meaning into the statute on its own.3'
The alternative argument supporting the use of child abuse
statutes to prosecute women for their drug use while pregnant seeks
to "prosecute [the mother] under the statute for prenatal conduct that
caused [the baby] injury after her birth" even though the conduct
occurred before birth.3 2 This kind of argument essentially seeks to
analogize child abuse to the common law rule that an assault upon
a pregnant woman could be prosecuted as manslaughter if the baby
died only after being born alive.33 As in child abuse prosecutions under
the "delivery theory," these arguments attempt and fail to overcome
the legislative intent manifest in the statute.34
C. Prosecutions Under Manslaughter Statutes
Interestingly, even a Hawaii prosecution for manslaughter based
upon the mother's prenatal drug use, where her son was born alive
and subsequently died, failed.3' The court compared caselaw from
around the country on prosecutions based on prenatal drug use31 to
caselaw holding a third party guilty based on "conduct perpetrated
against a pregnant mother, causing the death of the subsequently
born child." 37 The court ultimately determined that Ms. Aiwohi did
not fall within the bounds of the Hawaii manslaughter statute because
the statute only applies to the death of a person, and the definition
of person does not include a fetus.38
D. Consideration of Prenatal Drug Use in Termination of Parental
Rights
A more predictable method of utilizing evidence of prenatal drug
use in judicial action against a new mother is to use this evidence to
justify the termination of parental rights. Although courts generally
31. Id.
32. Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
33. See Williams v. State, 550 A.2d 722, 725-26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), affid, 561
A.2d 216 (Md. 1989) (summarizing Sir Edward Coke's statement of the common law rule
(cited in 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (M. Flesher ed.,
London, W. Lee & D. Parkman 1644))).
34. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 735-36; State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1141-42 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 282-84 (Ky. 1993); People v.
Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843,845-47 (Geneva City Ct. 1992); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710,
712-13 (Ohio 1992).
35. State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005).
36. Id. at 1214-18.
37. Id. at 1218-21.
38. Id. at 1222-24.
2008]
642 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:635
tend to find this acceptable, they are by no means uniform in reaching
this conclusion.' The court in In re Valerie D. focuses primarily on
the problem of legislative intent, finding that the legislature did not
intend the child abuse statute to apply to facts involving prenatal
drug use.4° Courts reaching the opposite conclusion consider common
law discussion of manslaughter of an unborn child and the state's
interest in the health of an unborn viable child.4' Considering the fact
that there are few treatment options available for pregnant women
who use drugs, this initially seems to be an unjust conclusion, because
it in essence penalizes behavior that women have few viable options
for changing.42 If treatment options and better education are made
available to pregnant addicts, but the mother-to-be resists help and
continues to use drugs through her pregnancy, the only just option
for protecting the child after birth is to remove him or her from the
home at least temporarily. Use of termination of parental rights
proceedings where treatment options are unavailable will be a deter-
rent to women seeking treatment or prenatal care.4'
II. PROBLEMS WITH CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Constitutional Implications
1. Procedural Due Process and Vagueness
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution guarantees that "[n]o
State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
39. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that evidence
of a newborn baby's withdrawal symptoms indicating its mother's prenatal drug use is suf-
ficient to support a finding of child neglect for the purpose of terminating parental rights);
In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985) (finding that evidence of prenatal
consumption of alcohol by the mother was sufficient to prove child neglect for the pur-
pose of termination of parental rights); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986) (finding
that evidence of Nora Ruiz's heroin use while she was pregnant was sufficient evidence
to prove child abuse for the purpose of terminating her parental rights). But see, e.g., In
re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 755-56 (Conn. 1992) (finding that Ms. D.'s prenatal drug use
could not be used as evidence to justify the termination of her parental rights).
40. In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d at 759-65.
41. In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334-35; In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936-38.
42. E.g., Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. From the Womb:A Call for New York Legislation
Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199,203,208-09, 213
(1993) (proposing legislation criminalizing prenatal drug use in order to prevent prose-
cutions "based on the subjective and often discriminatory whims of state officials.");
Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1260.
43. See Schuyler Frautschi, Understanding the Public Health Policies Behind Ferguson,
27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 587, 596-97 (2002) (examining the problems with the
Ferguson policy of delivering positive urinalysis results to the police for legal action, which
resulted in some women avoiding the program for fear of having their children taken
away).
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due process of law."44 A standing principle of criminal law recognizes
that "[d]ue process prohibits prosecutors and courts from interpret-
ing or applying an existing law in an unforeseeable or unintended
manner." 45 This principle is why the issue of legislative intent is so
crucial: if the state legislature did not intend or foresee these results
when it drafted child abuse, delivery, and manslaughter statutes, any
argument that such statutes can be the basis for criminal prosecution
in instances of prenatal drug use must fail.46
Prosecutors' use of statutes criminalizing the delivery of con-
trolled dangerous substances is so inventive as to be constitutionally
problematic.47 Women prosecuted under these statutes "could not
reasonably have known that [they] would be prosecuted for 'delivering'
or'distributing' cocaine to [their] unborn child[ren] if [they] ingested
[drugs] while pregnant."48 The accepted definitions of delivery and
distribution as used in the delivery statutes are so far afield from
the transmission of drug metabolites via the umbilical cord as to
render that argument absurd.4 9
Further, prosecutors' arguments that fetuses fall directly within
the ambit of child abuse statutes is manifestly problematic. Unless
fetuses are expressly included within the text of a statute, it is im-
possible to say that these statutes cover prenatal activity directly. 0
Fetuses have never been held to be people, most notably in the arena
of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence,51 but also in the context
of the Social Security Act of 193552 and under certain guardianship
statutes.53 Common law once dictated that wrongful death suits
could only be brought on behalf of a fetus where the fetus died after
live birth; this rule has since been modified in most jurisdictions, and
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. Carol Jean Sovinski, Comment, The Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse:
A Quick Fix to a Complex Problem, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 118 (1997) (discussing constitu-
tional and deterrence problems with prenatal substance abuse prosecutions and proposing
increased treatment options as a more viable alternative).
46. See id. at 116-17.
47. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1431-32 (1991) (discussing
the disparate impact of nationwide prosecutions of poor women of color for prenatal drug
abuse as a reproductive rights issue which serves to perpetuate historical devaluation of
black motherhood); see also Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1270.
48. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
49. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992); see also Luster, 419 S.E.2d
at 34.
50. See People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846-47 (Geneva City Ct. 1992).
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
52. See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975).
53. E.g., In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a guardian could not be appointed to represent the interests of a fetus
separate from the mother).
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suits are now limited to situations where the fetus is viable at the
time of the injury.54 Holding that fetuses are children for the purposes
of child abuse statutes where no legislative intent exists to that end
would fly in the face of established jurisprudence.
Prosecutors attempt to circumvent this problem by arguing that
prenatal abuse is ripe for criminal prosecution because it has inju-
rious effects after the fetus is born, i.e., once it is a person.55 This inter-
pretation contradicts "the accepted principle that criminal statutes
focus on the conduct of the accused, not on the status of the alleged
victim." 6 Adopting these prosecutors' arguments would mean focus-
ing on the result of the conduct (the newborn's addiction to drugs),
rather than the conduct itself (the ingestion of drugs).
Further, if the trend reverses and courts find that these various
child abuse and drug-delivery statutes and theories do support prose-
cutions for prenatal drug use, it will open up a veritable Pandora's
box of potential crimes for a wide range of otherwise ordinary activ-
ities that could have deleterious effects when engaged in by a pregnant
woman. 57 The statutes therefore would "transgress reasonably iden-
tifiable limits; they [would] lack fair notice and violate constitutional
due process limits against statutory vagueness" because of the literal
impossibility of predicting what will subject the mother to criminal
liability.5" Courts already note that upholding convictions for
prenatal drug use may lead to prosecutions for more ordinary and
legal activity that might cause harm to a fetus, from
consuming alcoholic beverages to excess, to smoking, to not
maintaining a proper and sufficient diet, to avoiding proper and
available prenatal medical care, to failing to wear a seat belt
while driving, to violating other traffic laws in ways that create a
substantial risk of producing or exacerbating personal injury to
her child, to exercising too much or too little, indeed to engaging
in virtually any injury-prone activity that, should an injury occur,
might reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of
the child.5"
54. Note, supra note 13, at 1004.
55. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
56. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 736.
57. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Md. 2006) (reasoning that these kinds of
prosecutions "could well be construed to include not just the ingestion of unlawful con-
trolled substances but a whole host of intentional and conceivably reckless activity that
could not possibly have been within the contemplation of the Legislature").
58. Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993).
59. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 311.
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This slippery slope is inevitable and not a mere logical fallacy: a few
women have in fact already been prosecuted for otherwise legal acts
undertaken while pregnant, although their prosecutions were ulti-
mately unsuccessful."° The most well-known of these cases is State
v. Deborah J.Z., in which Ms. J.Z. consumed alcohol during the week
before her due date and was then unsuccessfully prosecuted for
attempted "first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree reckless
injury."6 According to the court in Kilmon v. State, "[i]f the State's
position [in these cases] were to prevail, there would seem to be no
clear basis for categorically excluding any of those activities from the
ambit of the statute; criminal liability would depend almost entirely
on how aggressive, inventive, and persuasive any particular prose-
cutor might be."62
2. Substantive Due Process and Privacy
The landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut provides the frame-
work for the discussion of privacy concerning familial and procreative
decisions.6" Although that case specifically discussed only protecting
the marital relationship, its holding in fact creates a right to privacy
concerning intimate matters such as decisions about procreation.64
No less important a right than whether to have children is how to
conduct one's life once one is already pregnant.65 For this reason,
although few if any people would argue that women should imbibe
drugs and alcohol while they are pregnant, criminalizing such conduct
is problematic.6 The women that these prosecutions generally seek
to hold responsible - poor women of color - are frequently women
who do not have access to prenatal care and education.67 These women
may not have access to information informing them of the risks and
dangers inherent in continuing to use drugs while pregnant.6" Even
60. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1997) (holding Kawana Ashley could not
be charged with the death of her child "resulting from self-inflicted injuries during the
third trimester of pregnancy); State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding that Deborah J.Z. could not be held criminally liable for her ingestion of alcohol
late in her pregnancy).
61. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 491.
62. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 311-12; see also Johnsen, supra note 13, at 586.
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Id. at 485-86; Note, supra note 13, at 998.
65. See Note, supra note 13, at 998-1001.
66. See id. at 1000.
67. See Kimani Paul-Emile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 325, 349-51, 374 (1999) (discussing the disparate impact of the Charleston policy
on poor women of color and the need for increased access to prenatal care and substance
abuse treatment); Roberts, supra note 47, at 1432-33.
68. See Note, supra note 13, at 1010-11.
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where a woman is aware of the risks, she simply may be unable to
give up her drug habit because she cannot afford treatment or, more
tellingly, because of the lack of resources available for treatment of
pregnant female addicts. 9 As one commentator noted, "[t]he state's
belief that a woman has made an ill-considered choice does not entitle
it to criminalize her procreative decision."70
Further, enforcing laws proscribing drug use during pregnancy
for the purpose of preventing prenatal drug use is akin to mandating
medical treatment against the will of the patient-mother.7 Courts
already acknowledge such mandates as a violation of the consti-
tutionally protected right of bodily integrity.72 The only reasonable,
reliable, and long-term effective means of stopping drug use is through
a rehabilitation program, where the withdrawal process, while still
incredibly painful and disruptive, can be managed by medical profes-
sionals.7" Forcing an individual to undergo withdrawal unassisted
is akin to forcing patients to undergo stomach pumping, to take anti-
psychotic drugs, or to submit to treatment for their own or a family
member's benefit, all medical procedures that courts conclude may
not be constitutionally mandated.74
Ultimately, these arguments are analytically problematic be-
cause they frame the issue as protecting a woman's right to engage
in an illegal activity, namely, substance abuse. In the case of criminal
prosecutions for prenatal substance abuse, however, the behavior
under attack is not so much the drug use, but the continuation of the
pregnancy while addicted to drugs.7" Notably, "[tihe woman's right
at issue is not the right to abuse drugs or to cause the fetus to be born
with defects." 76 The right these mothers are attempting to exercise
is the right to procreate despite being addicted to drugs.77 The right
to procreate - or not - is manifestly protected by the holding in
Griswold.78
69. Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 375.
70. Note, supra note 13, at 1001.
71. Id. at 1001-02.
72. Id.
73. See Philip Bean & Teresa Nemitz, Introduction to DRUG TREATMENT: WHAT WORKS?
5 (Philip Bean & Teresa Nemitz eds., 2004); Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 385 n.295.
74. Note, supra note 13, at 1002 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372
(D.C. 1972)).
75. Roberts, supra note 47, at 1462-63.
76. Id. at 1462.
77. Id. at 1462-63.
78. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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3. Equal Protection
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, "[n]o
State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."79 The seminal cases on gender-based equal
protection issues, Craig v. Boren' and Michael M. v. Sonoma County
Superior Court,"' both find gender to be a protected class, but only
within certain parameters. Although gender, unlike race, is not an
"inherently suspect" class, gender classifications are subject to a
more stringent test than the traditional rational relation test.8 2 To
be constitutionally permissible, classifications based on gender must
serve important governmental interests and be substantially related
to those interests.8 3 Gender classifications that merely rely upon or
impose gender stereotypes cannot be constitutionally permitted. 4
The contrary is also true: where men and women are genuinely not
"similarly situated," they may be treated differently for the purpose
of gender-based classifications.8 "
Criminal prosecutions for prenatal substance abuse create a de
facto gender classification in that only mothers are prosecuted for
their children's injuries.' Initially it may appear that men and women
are not similarly situated for the purposes of childbearing, because
women and not men carry children to term and it is women's life-
style choices that most obviously impact the health of the fetus.8 7 In
fact, at least one study indicates that drug use by men can likewise
impact fetal health.8 Further, holding women alone responsible for
injuries sustained by their children as a result of parental substance
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
81. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
82. Id. at 468.
83. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
84. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469; Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99.
85. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469.
86. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing
Teresa Lopez Reinesto's indictment for child abuse for her prenatal drug use); Johnson
v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (overturning the conviction of Jennifer Clarice
Johnson for her prenatal drug use and subsequent delivery of a controlled substance);
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005) (reversing the trial court's denial of Tayshea
Aiwohi's motion to dismiss charges of manslaughter based on her prenatal drug use).
87. See Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal
Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1232 (1987).
88. See Johnsen, supra note 13, at 608 (citing Sandra Blakeslee, Research on Birth
Defects Shifts to Flaws in Sperm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at Al; Devra L. Davis, Fathers
and Fetuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A27; Father's Smoking May Damage Sperm,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1991, at A8); Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration of Specific
Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1956 (1991).
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abuse perpetuates the stereotype that women alone bear the respon-
sibility for childbearing and fetal health. 9
Although it is true that holding men responsible for drug use that
harms future children is highly impractical,9 ° it does not follow that
women alone can constitutionally be prosecuted. "[A]dministrative
ease and convenience" are not sufficiently important governmental
objectives to permit otherwise impermissible gender classifications.9
If prosecutors persist in seeking to hold women criminally respon-
sible for fetal injuries as a result of parental substance abuse, they
should apply the same statutes to new fathers with substance abuse
problems.
Overzealous prosecutors' problems with the Equal Protection
Clause do not end with gender. The brunt of criminal prosecutions for
parental substance abuse falls on poor women of color,92 as the major-
ity of the women criminally prosecuted for prenatal substance abuse
have been poor women of color. 3 Proof of disparate impact is rele-
vant to show racial discrimination, although not alone dispositive.94
An instructive example is the Medical University of South
Carolina's Interagency Policy of Management of Substance Abuse
During Pregnancy, in place from 1989 until the Supreme Court found
it to be unconstitutional in 2001.9 According to one commentator who
has extensively studied the policy, it "established a protocol which
required: (i) [drug] testing, without consent, women who sought ob-
stetrical care; (ii) disclosing the results of these tests to third persons;
(iii) arresting women who tested positive; and (iv) criminally prose-
cuting them." 96 Although the policy was found to be unconstitutional
because the urine tests constituted unreasonable searches under the
Fourth Amendment,97 the policy also had a disproportionate impact
upon African-American women.
98
Between 1989 and 1999, the policy justified the arrest of thirty
women, only one of whom was white,99 although the racial balance
of positive tests for drugs reflected the natural racial balance of the
89. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 608.
90. Chan, supra note 42, at 224.
91. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
92. Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 349.
93. Roberts, supra note 47, at 1421.
94. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886)).
95. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 326.
96. Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 326.
97. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76-85.
98. Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 326.
99. Id. at 328 n.10.
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maternity ward at the hospital: "68% Black and 32% White."' o Nota-
bly, the single white woman arrested "was distinguished in medical
charts as having a 'Negro boyfriend."' The policy was implemented
at a hospital unique in South Carolina for its service of a large pro-
portion of black patients and in such as a way to target cocaine users
exclusively, factors that "inevitably skew[ed] the Policy to dispropor-
tionately impact Black women." 102 The very design of the policy was
to target poor women of color.
1 3
Racist criminal prosecution for prenatal substance abuse is not
limited to this policy in South Carolina. Nationwide, prosecutors tend
to focus on prenatal crack cocaine use. 104 Perhaps a reaction to hys-
teria over the so-called "crack epidemic,"0 5 these prosecutions tend
also to be of poor black women.' 6 Although crack cocaine is not the
only drug abused by pregnant women that has serious detrimental
effects on the fetus, crack cocaine is a drug found disproportionately
in "inner-city Black communities." ' 7 Ultimately, these prosecutions
are prompted by and reinforce societal notions of black mothers as
undeserving and inadequate.' There is no reason to focus on preg-
nant crack cocaine users, while ignoring pregnant women addicted
to drugs not disproportionately used by members of the poor African-
American population. These prosecutions, grounded in stereotypes
and racism, cannot be justified against equal protection attacks.
B. Public Policy Implications
The fact that these prosecutions mainly target women of color
addicted to cocaine or crack suggests that the use of drug delivery
and child abuse statutes to combat prenatal drug use is merely a
response to "crack baby hysteria," rather than an indicator of any
real concern about the effects of drugs on the fetus."°9 Although prose-
cutors generally justify these charges as protecting fetal health,"0
100. Id. at 351.
101. Id. at 326.
102. Id. at 349.
103. Id. at 360.
104. Roberts, supra note 47, at 1421.
105. Id. at 1428.
106. Id. at 1445.
107. Id. at 1435.
108. Id. at 1436-44.
109. Frautschi, supra note 43, at 594-96; Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 356-57; Roberts,
supra note 47, at 1434.
110. Marcy Tench Stovall, Note, Looking for a Solution: In re Valerie D. and State
Intervention in Prenatal Drug Abuse, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1265, 1278 (1993) (approaching
prenatal drug abuse prosecution as "a legal solution for a health-care problem" by rejecting
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this cannot be so: these types of prosecutions create a far greater risk
to fetal health by discouraging pregnant drug users from seeking
prenatal care for fear of being prosecuted."'
1. Health Care Response to Prosecutions
Prenatal care is widely acknowledged to be a very important
factor affecting fetal health.1 ' Health care workers have united
against being forced to produce newborns' urine samples revealing
maternal drug use, arguing vehemently that to do so will cause preg-
nant drug users to avoid medical care entirely. 13 Further, they argue,
forcing health care workers to produce such evidence undermines
patient-physician relationships." 4
Not only do health care workers oppose the use of newborns' urine
samples as evidence in these prosecutions, respected medical asso-
ciations, including the American Medical Association, the American
Public Health Association, and the American Society on Addiction
Medicine oppose these types of prosecutions entirely."' As one com-
mentator noted, even "groups that are primarily concerned with the
health and rights of children, such as the American Academy of
Pediatrics, the Center for the Future of Children, and the March of
Dimes, also oppose punitive approaches to substance abuse and
pregnancy."" 6 These organizations have reached the common-sense
conclusion that imposing punishments on women seeking prenatal
care is counterintuitive and will ultimately drive women away from
health care resources, putting their offspring at greater risk."7 Most
notably, these prosecutions drive drug-addicted women away from
the very health care that their drug-addicted fetuses need."8
criminal sanctions and promoting education, substance abuse treatment, and prenatal
care).
111. Frautschi, supra note 43, at 616; Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 356; Roberts,
supra note 47, at 1449; Stovall, supra note 110, at 1266.
112. Note, supra note 13, at 1010.
113. See, e.g., Frautschi, supra note 43, at 597 (citing the research of Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff,
director of the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education).
114. Stovall, supra note 110, at 1278.
115. Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical
Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women,
264 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2663, 2666-67 (1990); Johnsen, supra note 13, at 602; Sovinski,
supra note 45, at 131-32.
116. Sovinski, supra note 45, at 131-32.
117. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 595, 602; Sovinski, supra note 45, at 131-32.
118. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 603.
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2. Maternal Interests Versus Fetal Interests
Rather than viewing the mother and fetus as having parallel
interests, 19 prosecutors using these statutes set up a situation in
which the fetus's legal rights are in opposition to the mother's rights
by arguing that the fetus's right to be born healthy trumps the
mother's right to bodily integrity and privacy.12 ° Doing so treats
women as little more than incubators for their children:1 21 the
mother's interests are subordinated to those of her unborn child,
prioritizing the mother's cessation of drug use by any possible means
over her safety and well-being. Prosecutors approach this situation
as if "the government's role is to protect the fetus from the woman." 122
Because pregnant women make innumerable decisions affecting the
fetus, from taking prenatal vitamins to engaging in illegal drug use,
this approach has no logical end.12
Numerous courts and commentators, including the court in
Kilmon v. State, note the slippery slope inherent in these prosecu-
tions. 124 Although prosecutors are generally unsuccessful in using
these statutes to target pregnant drug users, their continued attempts
suggest that they may make increasingly attenuated and outlandish
attempts. Courts and commentators express the concern that over-
zealous prosecutors will target even lawful, everyday behavior merely
because it is engaged in while pregnant. 25
3. Prosecutions Do Not Satisfy the Intended Goal
The stated goal of such prosecutions, to encourage women to seek
treatment, 126 is manifestly impossible. Few if any viable treatment
options exist for pregnant addicts, 127 as pregnancy entails a number
of additional health issues that complicate the recovery process." As
the American Medical Association noted, "it would be an injustice to
punish a pregnant woman for not receiving treatment for her sub-
stance abuse when treatment is not an available option to her."'' 21
119. Stovall, supra note 110, at 1280-81.
120. Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1261.
121. Id. at 1257.
122. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 571; see also Note, supra note 13, at 1010.
123. Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1261.
124. Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Kilmon v. State,
905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Md. 2006); Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1261.
125. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 311-12.
126. E.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992).
127. E.g., Chan, supra note 42, at 208; see also Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1260.
128. Roberts, supra note 47, 1448.
129. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 606 (quoting Board of Trustees, Am. Medical Ass'n, Legal
Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties
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Not only is treatment not as viable an option for pregnant addicts
as prosecutors appear to believe, but these prosecutions may further
endanger fetal health by pushing the addicted mother away from
prenatal health care for fear of being reported to the authorities.13 °
Further, some commentators have noted that these prosecutions
actually push expectant mothers toward having abortions for fear
of being criminally prosecuted.' 3 ' This is ironic, because the so-called
fetal rights advocates share an ideological viewpoint with antiabortion
extremists: both groups justify their viewpoint by arguing that fetal
health should trump maternal individual choice. 32 Along with causing
them harm by deterring their mothers from seeking prenatal care, in
some cases, these measures may ultimately kill some of these fetuses
through abortion.'33
III. ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION UNDER ABUSE OR DELIVERY
STATUTES
Despite the undesirability of criminal prosecutions under atten-
uated theories, the state has a responsibility toward the unborn chil-
dren of pregnant drug addicts." This responsibility should translate
to encouragement of both treatment for the mother and continuation
of adequate prenatal care.'35 The principal alternatives proposed by
commentators are drafting statutes to specifically sanction prenatal
drug abuse;'36 imposing civil commitment like that imposed on the
mentally ill; 137 and improving education on the impact of drug use
on fetal health while simultaneously providing greater access to
treatment for pregnant addicts.'38
for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2663, 2669
(1990)).
130. Id. at 603-04.
131. Id. at 586; Kristen Rachelle Lichtenberg, Comment, Gestational SubstanceAbuse:
A Call for a Thoughtful Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 392 (1990).
132. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437 (1983) ("Once [a woman] decides to forgo abortion
and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty to act in ways that
would adversely affect the fetus.'); National Right to Life, Abortion: Some Medical Facts -
Defining "Abortion," http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF/asmf3.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2008).
133. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 586; Lichtenberg, supra note 131, at 392.
134. See Note, supra note 13, at 1003.
135. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 613.
136. E.g., Chan, supra note 42, at 203-19.
137. Lichtenberg, supra note 131, at 387-95.
138. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 576; Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1291; Note, supra note
13, at 1011-12.
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A. Statutes Tailored to Prenatal Drug Use
Some commentators have proposed enacting "a criminal statute
that specifically proscribes drug use during pregnancy," with manda-
tory residential drug treatment as an alternative to imprisonment.
1 39
Supporters of this approach argue that women have a diminished
right to privacy in this context because of the nature of their illegal
acts and the state's interest in the well-being of the fetus.14 ° One
commentator has even suggested that once a woman decides to keep
a pregnancy, her rights with regard to that pregnancy are thereby
limited and she should no longer be permitted to act in ways poten-
tially adverse to her unborn child."4
Even if this is true, these types of prosecutions remain prob-
lematic. Although women would now be on notice that engaging in
reckless or unsafe behavior while pregnant could subject them to crim-
inal sanctions, it would simply not be possible to sufficiently define
exactly what misconduct would be illegal. 142 Even if the statute pro-
hibited drug use during pregnancy, issues of prescription drug and
alcohol use would remain hazy. Such a specific law could potentially
infringe on constitutionally-protected arenas of privacy and bodily
integrity because of the likelihood that the statute would fail to give
adequate notice of illegal behavior to expectant mothers.143 Likewise,
problems of equal protection with regard to gender and race would
remain, as it continues to be impractical to consistently make deter-
minations of the father's role in his child's fetal well-being, 144 and
there continues to be no guarantee that any such policy or statute
would not be applied with the intent of targeting race, as in the case
of the Charleston policy.14 The history of discrimination perpetrated
on women of color with regard to their procreative freedom should
further raise skepticism that the statutes will be applied dispassion-
ately.146 Because these same women are subject to simple possession
charges prior to pregnancy, if they are charged under these hypo-
thetical pregnant drug use statutes, they will in effect suffer an extra
penalty for the same behavior merely because they are pregnant.
147
139. Chan, supra note 42, at 214-15.
140. Id. at 221; Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1283-84.
141. Robertson, supra note 132, at 437.
142. Note, supra note 13, at 1006; see Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Md. 2006).
143. Note, supra note 13, at 1006.
144. Chan, supra note 42, at 224.
145. Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 334-60.
146. See id. at 334-49.
147. Id. at 384; Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1259.
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As a matter of public policy, statutes explicitly proscribing pre-
natal drug use would likely have some of the same impractical results
as prosecutions under inapplicable statutes: by pitting the fetus and
mother against each other,141 they would push women away from pre-
natal care and toward having abortions. 149 These results are obviously
antithetical to the stated goal of the proposed statutes.
15 0
No precedent exists for creating statutes prohibiting drug use
while pregnant. 1 ' State legislatures that have considered broadening
abuse statutes to encompass a newborn's physical dependency on con-
trolled substances have rejected these proposals, citing the concern
that it would lead to prosecutions for prenatal drug use.152 The fact
that no legislatures have thus far passed statutes proscribing drug
use while pregnant suggests that legislators do not believe any such
crime should exist.153 Although none of these assertions are binding on
any legislature, they are persuasive as to why it would be ill-advised
to enact such statutes.
B. Civil Sanctions
At least one scholar has proposed civil commitment as a solution
to the problem of prenatal substance abuse, in the vein of involuntary
commitment of drug addicts or the mentally ill."' This alternative
hopes to balance fetal rights and state interests against the mother's
privacy and bodily rights by acknowledging the problems inherent
in criminal prosecution and avoiding such punitive measures. 55
Ultimately the same problems exist with regard to civil commit-
ment as with criminalization. Although this commentator suggests
that drafting a statute narrowly will prevent slippery slope prob-
lems,'56 it would still open the door to sanctioning otherwise legal
behavior, including alcohol use, as the commentator suggests.'57 On
a practical level, there is very little difference between civil and crim-
inal commitment. One of the legal justifications for civil commitment
148. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 571; Note, supra note 13, at 1009.
149. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 586; Lichtenberg, supra note 131, at 392.
150. See Sovinski, supra note 45, at 127-32, 137; Stovall, supra note 110, at 1277.
151. Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1283.
152. Johnson v. Superior Court, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1293-94 (Fla. 1992).
153. Hodge, supra note 7, at 472-73 (citing State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Sheriff, Washoe County,
Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994)).
154. Lichtenberg, supra note 131, at 378.
155. Id. at 387-88.
156. Id. at 394.
157. Id. at 385.
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is the state's police power,"'8 and civil commitment still entails invol-
untary confinement for treatment of mental illness, drug addiction,
and the like.159 Civil commitment entails involuntary confinement,
restriction of movement and activity, and limited communication with
individuals not confined.16 ° Civil commitment is typically imposed
after a hearing before a judge or other neutral factfinder.' 6 ' In fact,
civil commitment can be regarded as "a massive curtailment of liberty,
in many ways one that is greater than penal incarceration."'1 62 Be-
cause of the involuntary nature of the commitment and the fact that
to a layperson it appears very much the same as criminal incarcera-
tion, pregnant drug users will still be deterred from seeking prenatal
care for fear of being committed.163 Although the proposed civil com-
mitment is marginally better than criminalization because it would
include treatment rather than merely confinement,"' civil commit-
ment must ultimately fail for the same reasons criminalization is
undesirable: it will fail to remedy the ultimate wrong, which is harm
to the fetus.
C. Increased Funding for Voluntary Treatment
The primary alternative to criminal or civil sanctions is to
provide more and better education to pregnant mothers and greater
funding and access to treatment for pregnant women.165 This is a
solution that actually gets at the goal prosecutors and legislators seek
to promote: the improvement of fetal health.'66 The same medical
groups that oppose fetal abuse support this option.'67 According to
the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Substance Abuse,
the "appropriate way to prevent intrauterine drug exposure is to edu-
cate women of childbearing age about the hazards of drugs to the
fetuses and to encourage drug avoidance.... [T]reatment programs
should be made readily available to pregnant women." 68 In this way,
158. GARY B. MELTON, PHILLIP M. LYONS, JR. & WILLIS J. SPAULDING, No PLACE TO Go:
THE CIL COMMITMENT OF MINORS 102-03 (1998).
159. See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL
1 (Carolina Academic Press 2005) (discussing civil commitment of mentally ill individuals).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 139.
162. Id. at 2.
163. Cf. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 603 (discussing a woman's reluctance to seek treat-
ment for fear of facing punishment).
164. Lichtenberg, supra note 131, at 394.
165. Kowalski, supra note 11, at 1258.
166. Stovall, supra note 110, at 1277.
167. Sovinski, supra note 45, at 132.
168. Id. (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Substance Abuse,
Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 641 (1990)).
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pregnant drug users will not be driven away from seeking prenatal
care by the threat of jail or similar confinement.
Although this solution may seem too toothless to be entirely
effective, this approach takes into consideration the notion that most
women have every desire to give birth to healthy babies.169 Providing
access to drug treatment programs capable of catering to the special-
ized needs of pregnant women and new mothers would greatly im-
prove fetal and infant health,17 a goal aligned with both fetal and
maternal interests.'
17
Once drug treatment programs and education about the dangers
of drugs to fetal health are made more available to pregnant drug
addicts, continued drug use by the expectant mother obviously cannot
be permitted. If the mother fails to make progress in her drug treat-
ment, once the baby is born, the household should be evaluated by the
appropriate department of social services to determine whether the
child should be removed from the home. In this way, the pregnant
addict is given every opportunity to amend her behavior. Because the
threat of criminal sanctions is removed and the threat that the child
will be taken away after birth is conditional and temporary, this
solution should not deter the mother-to-be from seeking prenatal
care, which is often the result of the use of proceedings for termina-
tion of parental rights along with the threat of prosecution and
imprisonment. 72
CONCLUSION
Threatening women with the prospect of special criminal prose-
cution because of their drug use while pregnant implicates a number
of constitutional issues. These issues include problems of vagueness
and due process that have been cited by courts, 73 equal protection
problems due to sexist and racist application, 74 and privacy prob-
lems,'75 which have been noted by commentators. The Kilmon court
is unique in that it recognized arguments proposed by commentators
169. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 575; Note, supra note 13, at 1011; see also Paul-Emile,
supra note 67, at 374-75.
170. Sovinski, supra note 45, at 132-33.
171. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 573-76; Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 380; see Kowalski,
supra note 11, at 1290.
172. Frautschi, supra note 43, at 616.
173. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch,
864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846-47 (Geneva
City Ct. 1992).
174. Johnsen, supra note 13, at 606-13; Paul-Emile, supra note 67, at 349-52; Roberts,
supra note 47, at 1432-36; Stovall, supra note 110, at 1274-76.
175. Note, supra note 13, at 998-1000; Roberts, supra note 47, at 1462-71.
MOTHERS VERSUS BABIES
but generally disregarded by courts, including the likelihood of
slippery slope problems leading to prosecutions for otherwise legal
activities.
176
These prosecutions are likewise undesirable as a matter of policy.
They deter women from seeking prenatal care, a critical factor influ-
encing fetal health. 177 The prosecutions do not even fulfill the stated
goal of protecting fetal life, and evidence exists that these prosecutions
may instead push woman toward having abortions. 17' For this reason,
it is especially important that the solution to the problem of prenatal
substance abuse encourages rather than discourages treatment and
prenatal care. Proposed solutions that look like punishments, such as
child abuse statutes that include prenatal substance abuse or civil
sanctions, will only serve as deterrents to prenatal care.179 The best
solution is to provide real access to treatment and better education
about the risks of prenatal drug abuse. 8 ° This approach recognizes
women's genuine desire to give birth to healthy babies,' the shared
interests and goals of women and their unborn children,'82 and
pregnant women's status as more than simply incubators.8 3
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